

Amateurs Imitate, Professionals Steal

I have appropriated this title from a self-interview which appears towards the end of Mark Kostabi's recent book, *Sadness Because the Video Rental Store was Closed*.¹ The book consists mainly of reproductions of paintings by Kostabi. Kostabi is noteworthy for publicizing that he neither paints his paintings, nor as a rule comes up with the ideas for them. He engages unemployed art school graduates to perform these tasks through ads in *The Village Voice*. Supposedly these assistants sometimes form various committees. One committee designs a piece, and the other committee paints it. Nonetheless, the paintings produced in this way, *Lovers* (1983), for example, bear Kostabi's "signature," and are sold as genuine artworks by Kostabi.²

Since Kostabi did not paint *Lovers*, his presenting it as a genuine artwork by Kostabi seems to border on forgery.³ But whether *Lovers* should be considered in some sense a forgery is problematic. Even if in one respect Kostabi has misrepresented the identity of the artist(s) who painted *Lovers* by having his "signature" affixed prominently in the painting's lower left-hand corner, it isn't clear that his doing so is fraudulent. At the same time, the claim that *Lovers* is a genuine Kostabi is equally problematic.

It is usual to believe that a painting cannot be a genuine artwork by *S* unless it was both designed and painted by *S*. This concept of a genuine artwork combines two notions: originality and authenticity. Sooner or later most art students realize that the fact that a painting is authentic is no guarantee that it is original. Van Meegeren's paintings show that a painting's originality does not guarantee its authenticity. Since Kostabi's paintings are as original as most artworks, in

what follows I limit my concern to their authenticity. Allowing that *Lovers* is a genuine artwork by Kostabi seems to violate the notion of authenticity essential for genuine works of art.

Kostabi can reply that the usual notion of authenticity conflates something's status as a mere artifact with its status as an authentic artwork. This reply challenges traditional assumptions about which events in a painting's history are relevant to the painting's identity as an authentic artwork by *S*. The view that *Lovers* is, in an important sense, inauthentic is grounded in a concept of authenticity that reflects our suppositions about an artwork's ontological status. Since these suppositions are in part definitive of our concept of art, Kostabi is challenging concepts that purport to ground the assumption that *Lovers* cannot be a genuine artwork by Kostabi.

In defense of his belief that *Lovers* is his artwork, Kostabi can remind us that there are numerous cases of authentic artworks by *S* that *S* neither designed nor produced (nor even materially altered). The canopener look-alike from the 1930s that Arthur Danto discusses in "Artworks and Real Things" is one of many examples.⁴ Just as the identity of the people who designed and manufactured this object has no bearing on its status as an authentic artwork, neither has the identity of the people who designed and produced *Lovers*. Those who think otherwise do not appreciate the implications of modernism.

Dissenters will immediately object that there is a world of difference between transfiguring found objects like canopeners, and creating authentic paintings. They will remind us that despite the numerous conceptual shifts in the arts, painting has managed to retain one requirement as absolutely essential: a painting is an

artwork by *S* only if designed and painted by *S* (hereafter, “painted by *S*”). Like all-too-many contemporary artists, Kostabi may ignore this. But it is a mistake to think that this requirement is negated by modernism.

Who should we believe, the dissenter or Kostabi? One way philosophers attempt to justify the dissenter’s notion of authenticity is by linking it with the view that paintings cannot have replicas (the view that separate paintings cannot be the same work of art). Consider *Black Square with Red* (oil on canvas, two joined panels, 1970) by Ellsworth Kelly. The dissenter’s view is that if someone presents a copy of *Black Square with Red* as the authentic *Black Square with Red* by Kelly, the copy is inauthentic. It does not replicate Kelly’s painting even if viewers will never perceive a difference between copy and original. (If presenting the copy as the authentic *Black Square with Red* involves fraud, the copy is considered a forgery.) Showing why even the best of copies does not replicate *Black Square with Red* is the first step in a defense of the dissenter’s notion of authenticity. It prepares the ground for the thesis that every painting’s identity as an authentic artwork by *S* is a function of who painted it. This ground clearing is necessary because if *Black Square with Red* is replicable, this notion of authenticity is ruled out.

Both Arthur Danto and Nelson Goodman present theories of art that apply this approach in developing their respective accounts of authenticity. Each philosopher’s theory is a paradigm semiotic analysis of art. Goodman’s view has a following among philosophers who want to do without meanings, whereas Danto’s appeals to those who cannot. In developing their views of why a painting is not an authentic artwork by *S* unless painted by *S*, both philosophers argue that paintings cannot have replicas.⁵ However, neither philosopher’s theory can be used to justify the dissenter’s reply to Kostabi.

Goodman’s problem is that an assumption crucial to his account is too strong. It implies that there is no significant sense in which paintings can be held to be artworks. On the other hand, the assumptions Danto makes in order to account for the transfiguration of real things into artworks imply that artworks of every sort are replicable. Danto has attempted to prove otherwise, but I will argue that his general account of

art is not compatible with the thesis that paintings are not replicable artworks. As it turns out, we can actually use Danto’s theory to defend Kostabi’s belief that *Lovers* is an authentic Kostabi.

Goodman maintains that painting is an autographic artform.⁶ As artworks, paintings are dense non-replicable symbol systems. To show that there is always an artistically relevant difference between copies and originals, Goodman observes that if an original painting is compared with a forgery, however excellent, “no one can ever ascertain by merely looking at the pictures that no one ever has been or will be able to tell them apart by merely looking at them.”⁷ Note that, appearances aside, Goodman is not resorting to a skeptical argument.⁸ If he were, his reasoning would imply that notational works can’t be replicated either. This implication is inconsistent with his general account of art. The definitive identification of a work requires only that there is something that at least theoretically constitutes a means by which we might ascertain its identity.⁹ It does not require that there is something that can be used to rule out the possibility that we misjudge its identity.

Goodman wants us to realize that a painting’s appearance does not even theoretically constitute a means for fixing its identity. Hence he stresses that “the fact that I may later be able to make a perceptual distinction between ... pictures that I cannot make now constitutes an aesthetic difference between them that is important to me now.”¹⁰ Because this reasoning applies to any pair of paintings, it tells us why there is an aesthetic difference between even the best of copies and the painting copied, no matter how alike the two paintings appear to us now.

Goodman’s account of why a painting’s appearance cannot fix its identity as an artwork implies that separate paintings cannot be the same aesthetic object. If two paintings cannot be the same aesthetic object, they cannot be the same artwork.¹¹ Thus Goodman’s account provides an explanation of why paintings are not replicable. This clears the ground for his thesis that a painting is an authentic artwork by *S* only if painted by *S*. The assumption that does the work is that the fact that we may learn to perceive an aesthetic difference between two paintings constitutes an aesthetic difference between them now. This crucial assumption has two

unusual implications. First, if the fact that someone may later discern what no one discerns now constitutes an aesthetic difference now, it follows that a painting's identity as an aesthetic object is inaccessible. No painting is the aesthetic object it appears to be now.

Goodman qualifies his claim that the fact that we may perceive a difference constitutes an aesthetic difference by remarking that: "Not every difference in or arising from how the pictures happen to be looked at counts; only differences in or arising from how they are to be looked at."¹² Either this qualification invalidates his reason for saying that there is an aesthetic difference between any copy and the painting copied, and thus vacates this account of why paintings that look alike cannot be replicas of the same artwork. Or the difference he says we may learn to perceive between copy and original must be a difference arising from how one or the other of the paintings is to be looked at.

There is no reason to assume that the difference we may learn to perceive arises from how the copy is to be looked at, rather than from how the original is to be looked at. If we assume this, then Goodman's reasoning will not apply to paintings whose similarity in appearance is only coincidental. We might hold that Goodman's reasoning only applies to cases of forgery, since at one point he says that it is our knowledge that one painting is a forgery of another that "stands as evidence that there may be a difference between them that I can learn to perceive."¹³ But if we take this position we beg the question against philosophers who maintain that copies that are indistinguishable from originals are replicas, not forgeries. We also ignore the broader implications of Goodman's remark that "pictures differ aesthetically for me now even if no one will ever be able to tell them apart merely by looking at them."¹⁴

When Goodman makes this remark, he is describing what "informs the nature and use" of our visual experience.¹⁵ His claim is that however alike the forgery and the original appear to us, we know that there are factual differences between them. He says that this knowledge informs our present visual experience, since it is evidence that we may learn to perceive a difference between the two paintings. But we know that there are factual differences between any two paintings, regardless of whether one of the

paintings is a forgery. This knowledge informs our experience of any pair of paintings. Further, we don't know everything that is artistically relevant about any painting. It follows that we may learn to perceive any painting differently than we do now. This knowledge informs our experience of any single painting.

Suppose that the fact that our perception of a particular painting may change does constitute an aesthetic difference between it and paintings we perceive as having the same appearance. In this case, this fact constitutes an aesthetic difference between the aesthetic object the painting is now and the aesthetic object we perceive it to be now. The aesthetic object the painting is now cannot be the aesthetic object we perceive now. We may learn to make a perceptual distinction in any painting at any time. So there will always be a gap between what we perceive, and the painting's identity as an aesthetic object.

This gap cannot be bridged by appealing to facts about a painting's history. Facts about a painting's history are not the exclusive determinants of how it is to be looked at. For example, it may be that some aesthetic objects should be perceived from a romantic perspective, even though they were not created by romantics or to be romantic, and even though the viewer is not a romantic. Thus it is not uncommon for people who know that they are attending to a painting they have studied previously to perceive the painting differently, despite the fact that their understanding of the painting's etiology has not changed. From their point of view an *imaginative* alteration of their perspective on how the painting is to be looked at achieves this result. They did not have to revise their actual beliefs about the painting's etiology. If Goodman's argument shows that a painting's look cannot fix its identity as an aesthetic object, it indirectly shows that facts about a painting's history of production cannot fix its identity as an aesthetic object. These facts do not suffice to fix how a painting is to be looked at.

Second, it follows from Goodman's reasoning that there can be no significant predicative import associated with the claim that paintings are aesthetic objects, accessible or not. Applied to a painting's temporal stages, Goodman's assumptions imply that a painting cannot be the same aesthetic object at different points in time. Since we may perceive a difference between any

two of the painting's temporal stages arising from how they are to be looked at, each of a painting's successive stages belongs to a different aesthetic object. Time being infinitely divisible, a painting's duration as a specific aesthetic object is insignificant. If Goodman's argument shows that a painting's look cannot fix its identity as an aesthetic object, it also shows that there is no significant sense in which a painting can be held to be an aesthetic object.

The reply that the aesthetic differences perceived at any two times are linked by facts about how the aesthetic object is to be looked at and thus are differing stages of the same aesthetic object misses the point. If the fact that there is an aesthetic difference between x and y implies that x and y are different aesthetic objects, then Goodman cannot analyze aesthetic properties as he does other perceptible properties. There is always a difference between how a painting's stages are looked at now and how they are to be looked at.

In *The Structure of Appearance* Goodman analyzes perceptible properties as functions of "some more or less fully prescribed pattern" of sets of presentations.¹⁶ The problem is, when we are dealing with aesthetic presentations each differing presentation of an aesthetic object divorces its object from the object of every other presentation. It is not just that neither historical facts nor appearances suffice to identify aesthetic objects. Since there is always a difference between how a painting's stages are looked at now and how they are to be looked at, there is no basis on which to constitute a set of presentations as a pattern. This means that not only is it impossible that a set of differing presentations constitute presentations of the same aesthetic object, strictly speaking, there are no aesthetic properties (in Goodman's sense of "property"). Consequently, there are no aesthetic objects.

If we accept Goodman's claims about what constitutes an aesthetic difference, we are forced to conclude that at best an aesthetic object's duration is infinitely short, and at worse there are no aesthetic objects. Goodman's discussion of the aesthetic difference between separate paintings presumes that artworks are aesthetic objects. So his position implies that there is no significant sense in which paintings are artworks. In this case, people who believe that every artwork is an aesthetic object cannot use

Goodman's theory to show that *Lovers* is not an authentic artwork by Kostabi.

This brings us to Arthur Danto's theory of art. Danto believes that an artwork's identity is a function of its meaning, and that its meaning is a function of what the artist uses it to state.¹⁷ An artwork is a non-verbal metaphor for the artist's statement. Danto's understanding of the notion of an authentic painting by S is rooted in his analysis of why non-verbal metaphors cannot be replicated. He emphasizes that it is sometimes thought that copies can replicate originals, provided that they really are indiscernible from originals under ordinary viewing conditions. He says that this point of view mistakenly assumes that an artwork's identity depends upon its exhibited properties. His position is that something's status and identity as a particular artwork actually depends on its non-exhibited semantic and historical properties.

In general, metaphorical statements can have replicas (separate inscriptions can instantiate the same metaphor). So why can't separate paintings be the same artwork in a way analogous to that in which separate texts can be the same literary work? Danto's answer is that exact copies of paintings are analogous to quotations of texts. He says that:

it is a general truth that quotations do not really possess the properties possessed by what is quoted: they *show* something that has those properties but do not have them themselves. A quotation cannot be scintillating, profound, witty, or shrewd; or, if it is, these qualities attach to the circumstances of quotation and not to the passages quoted.¹⁸

One problem with this answer is that Danto's own extensive use of quotation is intelligible only if a quotation's quotes-content (the inscription within quotation marks) expresses what is expressed by the remark quoted, as a copy of a manuscript expresses what is expressed by the original. Since Danto holds that something's artistic character is a function of what it expresses, if his use of quotation is intelligible then a quotes-content that replicates the original remark has the artistic character of the remark it replicates. Moreover, when we examine the account Danto gives of the logic of quotation in chapter seven of *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* we find that the formal characteristics

he ascribes to quotations turn out to be the same characteristics he attributes to artworks. For example, Danto says that quotations are intentional in that they reflexively refer to the form they exemplify, which is exactly what he says of artworks.¹⁹ He also tells us that “in quoting one may, in addition to citing the words, express agreement with them; the embedded sentence is both mentioned and used in a single act of speech.”²⁰ Since this implies that the quotes-content express what is expressed by the words quoted, the quotes-content has the original’s artistic properties. Thus by telling us that copies are analogous to quotations Danto suggests, unintentionally, that accurate copies of paintings should be viewed as replicas of the original artwork.²¹

Since the early 1960s, one of Danto’s primary aims has been to use the notion that an artwork expresses the artists’ statement to develop a theory of art that accounts for how artworks can be as varied as Victor Spinski’s *Bones*, and Sherrie Levine’s *After Piet Mondrain*. Materially, *Bones* is a manufactured trash can filled with animal bones, whereas *After Piet Mondrain* is a painting which mimics Mondrian’s paintings. It is understandable that Danto encounters difficulties when he uses a theory that is designed to fit these and other radically differing artforms in an attempt to support the traditional view of authentic painting.

To ensure that we understand why his theory can fit any artform, however radical, Danto emphasizes that “anything can be an expression of anything, provided we know the conventions under which it is one and the causes through which its status is to be explained.”²² In fact, the artworld refuses to embrace conventions that restrict the sorts of things artists can use to make their statements. If we accept this practice we acknowledge that while an object’s identity as an authentic artwork by *S* depends upon its instantiating *S*’s metaphor (or, more broadly, its making *S*’s statement), its doing so does not require its being made or materially altered by *S*. Just as someone can transfigure a canopener or trash can they did not create without altering it materially, Kostabi can transfigure paintings he did not paint into “authentic artworks by Kostabi” by giving them significance as his pictorial metaphors. What is not generally recognized is that the semantic conventions necessary to sustaining this liberal practice make it possi-

ble for copies of paintings to be replicas of the original artwork.

Since Danto believes that a painting’s identity is a function of its metaphorical meaning, to determine whether paintings are replicable we need to know what links a painting with its meaning. Danto’s answer is that this connection is established as a result of collaboration between artists and viewers. When Danto discusses Lichtenstein’s *Portrait of Madame Cezanne* he remarks: “In order for the viewer to collaborate in the transfiguration, he must of course know the portrait, know the diagram of Loran, and accept certain connotations of the concept of the diagram, and then he must infuse the portrait with those connotations.”²³ The “connotations” the viewer must accept, which Danto elsewhere refers to as the artist’s statement, are not accessible through the object.²⁴ We cannot learn what *Portrait of Madame Cezanne* says just by looking at the painting. The semantic content necessary to a painting’s identity as a particular pictorial metaphor must exist external to the painting, and must do so in a form accessible to viewers.

No meaning that is accessible in this way, metaphorical or literal, can in principle be instantiated only once. The life of a painting as a particular work of art depends upon sustaining this infusion of meaning.²⁵ Since such meanings are essential to Danto’s ontology, he must accept that the conventions that account for how Kostabi can transfigure his assistant’s products into artworks might also account for why it is possible that you or I produce artworks by Kostabi. This holds even if Kostabi’s artworks are autobiographical, as we see when we consider the many replicas of autobiographical literary works. If viewers infuse two visually indiscernible paintings with Kostabi’s meaning, why isn’t the copy Kostabi did not paint, like the original he did not paint, an authentic artwork by Kostabi?

The dissenter may reply that what holds for notational metaphor does not hold for pictorial metaphor. But Danto’s analysis of the transfiguration of various objects into pictorial metaphors does not support this claim. Unless there is a class of metaphors that can be realized by one and only one object, this is as it should be. Arguments for this class that require denying that there are meanings are of no use to Danto.

Arguments that do not reject meanings often conflate artworks with the unrepeatable events that initiate them. Kostabi's initially linking a painting he did not paint with his meaning is unrepeatable as a historically dated event. But this does not imply that *Lovers* cannot be replicated, just as it does not imply that *Lovers* ceases to exist with the termination of this event. *Lovers* is sustained by viewers who recognize its form and infuse it with Kostabi's meaning.

Whether a particular pictorial metaphor is in fact replicable depends upon two very different sorts of considerations. One is whether someone can actually produce a copy that shares the relevant aspects of the original's form. The other is whether the copy can actually become *Lovers* by being infused with Kostabi's meaning. At present, several of New York's commercial studios are competent to produce paintings that are indiscernible from *Lovers* under ordinary viewing conditions. So the question seems to be whether we can actually replicate *Lovers* by infusing a copy with Kostabi's meaning.

This question is complicated by the fact Danto believes that *Lovers*'s metaphorical meaning is a function of *Lovers*'s location in art history. If a copy cannot share *Lovers*'s location in art history, which includes sharing *Lovers*'s relation to the paintings that precede and follow it, the copy cannot share *Lovers*'s meaning, and so cannot replicate *Lovers*. Since Kostabi's painting is indexed to 1983, how can a copy produced at a later date share *Lovers*'s location in art history?

Danto's theory answers this question. A copy produced at a later date can replicate *Lovers* because the facts about a painting's etiology that are essential to its identity as an artwork by *S* do not necessarily include facts about who actually painted the painting. As with canopeners and trash cans, the essential historical factors are those that are relevant to *Lovers* being an artwork by Kostabi. It doesn't necessarily matter when Kostabi's assistants finished painting, nor who they were, and so on, since it is Kostabi's meaning that sustains their result as his artwork.

The historical factors that initially fix *Lovers*'s metaphorical significance and currently sustain its status as an artwork by Kostabi can also sustain a copy's status as *Lovers* by Kostabi. The fact that a painting is a copy does not negate the role these factors play as determinants of a paint-

ing's identity. Consider how readers of *Don Quixote* tie the meaning of Cervantes's text to events that occurred in the late sixteenth century. The fact that *Don Quixote*'s original manuscript was written by the Spaniard Cervantes, who used to be a soldier, and so on, fixes the identity of a contemporary edition of Cervantes's novel, not just the identity of his manuscript. Similarly, the historical factors knowledgeable viewers engage when they infuse the original *Lovers* with Kostabi's meaning are indexed to Kostabi's transfiguring the form produced by his assistants. (Note that *Lovers* structure as an artwork is a function of, but not reducible to, the painting's form.)

For a painting produced in 1989 to replicate *Lovers*, its meaning must be a function of the historical events of 1983 that are determinants of *Lovers*'s identity. Viewers whose art-historical knowledge is sufficient to sustain the original painting's status as *Lovers* can sustain a copy's status as *Lovers*. Someone may insist that viewers possessing the relevant knowledge refrain from infusing a copy with Kostabi's meaning. But this is rather like insisting that we should refuse to read texts descended from Cervantes's original manuscript as *Don Quixote*. Kostabi's meaning, like Cervantes's, is as easily engaged with a perfect copy as with the original. While a mere artifact, the copy is either preceded by *Lovers*, or, as Beardsley has claimed, lacks a location in art history.²⁶ But if the copy becomes infused with Kostabi's meaning it acquires *Lovers*'s location. As *Lovers*, the painting produced by copying is an artwork created in 1983.

If Danto's theory of art captures modernism's essence, it reveals its implications for the current postmodern stage in art history. The historical factors that are relevant to *Lovers* identity as an authentic Kostabi are not necessarily those that fix the original painting's identity as a mere artifact painted by so many anonymous others. Nor do the relevant historical factors prevent *Lovers* from having replicas. Those who think otherwise conflate a painting's status as a mere artifact with its status as an authentic artwork.

Taking a special interest in a painting's unique etiology as a mere artifact is not necessarily taking an interest in the etiological factors that fix a painting's identity as an authentic artwork by *S*. Since Kostabi, membership in the class of paintings identified relative to who painted them

is not coextensive with membership in the class of paintings identified as authentic artworks by S. For some people, these conclusions remain highly counter-intuitive. Such people find it very difficult to accept that a painting that was not painted by *Kostabi* can be a artwork by *Kostabi*. Nor can they accept that paintings are replicable artworks. When they discover the facts about *Lovers's* etiology, they insist that *Lovers* is not a genuine *Kostabi*. Collectors who are primarily interested in something *Kostabi* actually painted might even consider *Lovers* a forgery. I have argued that the notion of authenticity inherent in these widely shared intuitions is not supported by either Goodman's or Danto's theory of art. Danto's view actually opposes this notion. If Danto's theory is correct, the collector that worries about who actually painted *Lovers* fails to appreciate the contemporary nature of the work.

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1. Mark Kostabi, *Sadness Because the Video Rental Store Was Closed & Other Stories by Mark Kostabi*, ed. Sharon Gallagher (New York: Abbeville Press, 1988), p. 171.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 66–67.

3. A painting is a forgery if it is fraudulently misrepresented as a particular artwork by a specific artist. This notion of forgery conforms with the conditions on forgery W.E. Kennick describes in "Art and Inauthenticity," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 44 (1985), pp. 5–6.

4. Although materially indiscernible from the ordinary canopener it once was, the piece that Danto describes is now an artwork. See "Artworks and Real Things," *Theoria* 39 (1973); reprinted in *Art and Philosophy*, 2nd, ed., ed. W.E. Kennick (New York: St. Martin's, 1979), p. 101.

5. For Danto's account of why copies do not replicate originals, see Arthur Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 36–44, 50–51, 145–148, 203–204, "An Answer or Two for Sparshott," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 35 (1976), p. 85 and "Artworks and Real Things," pp. 103–105, 107. Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), pp. 99–122, especially pp. 103–105, 116.

6. Goodman, *Languages of Art*, pp. 113–122. An artwork is autographic if its identity must be fixed by its history of production.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 102. Goodman assumes that copies presented as originals are forgeries. He sees himself as showing why forgeries and originals must differ aesthetically. I want to allow the possibility that some so-called forgeries are replicas, and thus do not differ aesthetically from originals. So I will refer to "copy and original" rather than to "forgery and original." With one exception, this does not affect what I have to say about Goodman's position. The exception, which I discuss further on, involves what Goodman claims to follow from someone's knowing that a painting is a forgery.

8. "[T]he search for a proof that I shall never be able to see a difference between the two paintings is futile for more than technological reasons." *Ibid.*, p. 116.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

11. Goodman describes our powers of discriminating among works of art as "plainly aesthetic activities." *Ibid.*, p. 111.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

16. Nelson Goodman, *The Structure of Appearance* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), p. 132.

17. Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*, especially pp. 51–52, 83, 103, 141–149, 173–182, 189, 194, 197–198; "An Answer or Two for Sparshott," pp. 82–83; "Artworks and Real Things," p. 105.

18. Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*, p. 37.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 145–146.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 187.

21. My argument for this conclusion also applies to W.E. Kennick's attempt to use Danto's suggestion that copies are like quotations to show that "Copy and original may both be paintings (in some minimal sense of painting) ... but they are not both works of art." See "Art and Inauthenticity," pp. 9–10.

22. Danto, *Transfiguration of the Commonplace*, p. 65.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

24. Arthur Danto, "An Answer or Two for Sparshott," p. 83; *Transfiguration of the Commonplace*, p. 52.

25. This does not assume that a painting's significance as a pictorial metaphor is reducible to the meaning with which it is infused. The infusion of meaning creates something that is not reducible to either the material painting or to the connotations (meanings) with which it is infused. My argument is that what can be created in this way can be replicated in like form.

26. Monroe C. Beardsley, "An Aesthetic Definition of Art," in *What is Art*, ed. Hugh Curtler (New York: Haven, 1983), p. 27.